MORE FUZZY MATH IN THE DRUG WAR BUDGET  ( Top )

From Drug Sense Weekly, Issue #537
http://www.drugsense.org/nl/show_dsw.php?the_file=2008/ds08.n537#sec6

By Matthew Robinson, PhD

In our book - Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics - my co-author and I found numerous examples of misleading and outright false claims by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the federal agency of accountability in the nation's drug war. Among the many forms of misleading claims are improper presentations of statistics with regard to drug use trends; the (in)effectiveness of several drug war efforts such as market disruption and student drug testing programs; and even the presentation of partial drug war budget data.

The Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) was among the first organization to call ONDCP on its "fuzzy math" in the drug war budget. DPA found that, beginning with the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP removed from the budget those dollars spent on the drug war that did not directly relate to reducing drug use. Somehow, ONDCP reasoned it did not need to include in the drug war budget things like arresting and incarcerating drug offenders! ONDCP explained, in the 2003 Strategy, that "the budget reflects those expenditures aimed at reducing drug use rather than, as in the past, those associated with the consequences of drug use" (p. 6).

Of course, getting arrested and sent to prison for using drugs is not a consequence of drug use, as claimed by ONDCP, but rather is a consequence of the nation's prohibitionist drug policy. Leaving this point aside, it boggles the mind to think that failing to include such spending in the drug war budget makes the budget more useful for policymakers, but that is exactly what ONDCP claims!

The net effect of the changes to drug war budget is the appearance that: 1) we are spending less money on the nation's drug war than we actually are (the drug war budget was magically reduced from more than $19 billion in 2002 to only about $11 billion in 2003); and 2) a higher proportion of drug war spending was going to the more successful demand side efforts of prevention and treatment rather than the less successful supply side efforts of market disruption. Table 2 of the FY 2003 budget summary, contained in the 2002 Strategy, reports that 67% of spending went to supply side measures versus only 33% to demand side measures. Yet, Table 2 of the FY 2003 budget summary, contained in the 2003 Strategy, reports that 53% of spending will go to supply side measures versus 47% to demand side measures!. Get that? Just by changing the budget format, ONDCP magically shrank the amount going to supply side measures from 67% to 53% and grew the amount going to demand side measures from 33% to 47%.

Notice that I wrote "appearance" above, because the fact remains that: 1) taxpayers are still paying billions of additional dollars to fight the drug war (even though it is not shown in ONDCP's budget); and 2) the vast majority of drug war spending is still going to supply side efforts rather than the more effective demand side measures.

Presently, ONDCP is nearing release of its 2008 National Drug Control Strategy, which promises more of the same drug war rhetoric found in past versions. I recently was given access to the FY 2009 drug war budget (not yet released to the public), and funding for supply side measures will grow to 65.2% of total funds, versus only 34.8% for demand side measures. Yet, ONDCP will continue to call the drug war "balanced and compassionate."

This is astounding, because even after ONDCP's budget change, the disparity between supply side and demand side spending has grown rapidly. In FY 2002, supply side spending made up 55.1% of the budget, then grew to 56.6% in FY 2003, 58% in FY 2004, 60.4% in FY 2005, 63% in FY 2006, 63.4% in FY 2007, 64.4% in FY 2008, and ultimately 65.2% in FY 2009. To be clear, this is money spent on the "war" part of the drug war, including law enforcement, interdiction, and international spending.

Unfortunately for ONDCP and our nation, research shows that the most effective and cost-effective drug reduction approaches are demand side approaches such as prevention and treatment. One might then wonder why funding for these demand side measures has fallen from 49.6% in FY 2001 to only 34.8% for FY 2009.

Research very clearly points out that drug treatment works. One might then wonder why funding for drug treatment does not make up a larger portion of the drug war budget (funding for treatment in FY 2009 consists of only 24.1% of funds, and this includes money spent on treatment research)?

Research also shows that well-designed prevention messages reduce drug use among young people. One might then wonder why funding for prevention does not make up a larger portion of the drug war budget (funding for prevention in FY 2009 consists of only 10.7% of funds, and this includes money spent on prevention research)?

When you see the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy, you might also wonder why ONDCP continues to support funding for prevention efforts such as the Department of Education's Student Drug Testing program and ONDCP's Drug-Free Communities and National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, when evidence shows these measures are ineffective?

These are questions ONDCP must answer. After all, this is our drug war and ONDCP works for us.

Matthew Robinson is Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Appalachian State University in Boone, NC. He is co-author of Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics: A Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, State University of New York Press, 2007.